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LEARNING FROM NEPA:
GUIDELINES FOR RESPONSIBLE RISK LEGISLATION†
Celia Campbell-Mohn∗
John S. Applegate∗∗

I. Introduction
The current debate over the use of quantitative risk assessment in
health, safety, and environmental protection legislation breaks down,
broadly speaking, into three points of view. One view regards risk assessment with great skepticism and in some cases outright rejection.1 Individuals subscribing to this perspective believe that risk assessment
merely justifies industry and others in harming the public and the environment; it legitimates the status quo that regulation should improve.2
This view is typically associated with the environmental movement. Opposing thinkers view risk assessment as the foundation of rational regulation. Without structured, scientifically based, and quantitative information, federal agencies cannot hope to make sensible regulatory decisions.3

† This Article is based on a report by the authors to support a set of draft guidelines
for risk legislation, which the Rulemaking Committee of the Section on Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice was to propose for adoption by the American Bar Association. While the report explained the thinking behind the original draft guidelines, it (and
hence this article) is not an official product of the Committee or Section. At the October
1998 meeting of the Section’s leadership, the guidelines suggested herein were strongly
opposed for being unduly skeptical about risk assessment by several Section members who
represent industry and the Republican majority of the Congressional committees working
on risk legislation. As a result, the Section deferred its decision on these guidelines, and
the Section is now considering revised guidelines.
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.
∗∗ Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law–Bloomington.
1. An activist friend calls risk “a four-letter word.”
2. Examples of risk-assessment skeptics include Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 103; John
Atcheson, The Department of Risk Reduction or Risky Business, 21 Envtl. L. 1375 (1991);
Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 562 (1992) [hereinafter Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law]; see also Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk
Assessment, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 409 (1995).
A good spectrum of views can be found in an issue of the EPA Journal devoted to
this subject, Setting Environmental Priorities, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 18.
3. This view is described and sources cited in Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion
on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 295, 298–305 (1995) (describing the “science-policy landscape”)
[hereinafter Finkel, A Second Opinion]. Finkel himself is a pragmatist, as shown below.
Examples of this view include John D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 382 (1995) and Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, “More Good than
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While some proponents of the increased use of risk assessment in regulation have declared the inevitable expense and delay of formal analytical
requirements to be a positive benefit of such legislation—slow government action usually reduces regulatory burdens4—the majority presumably regard expense and delay as the unfortunate but unavoidable price of
good regulation. Industry tends to support the expanded use of risk assessment.
Between these contending positions lies a more pragmatic point of
view that encompasses an even greater spectrum of views than the two
poles. The pragmatic approach sees real value in risk assessment, particularly as a way to organize relevant information, but it recognizes the
serious limitations raised by its critics. The most important limitations
are our limited understanding of many of the physical processes that give
rise to risk (especially, but not only, toxic risk), the lack of adequate and
reliable data, and the incompleteness of quantified risk as a description
of the harms which regulation seeks to address.5 These difficulties are by
no means fatal defects, but they counsel humility and caution in using
risk assessment.6 The limitations also suggest the utility of public involvement in at least some parts of the risk assessment process. This
pragmatic approach appears in the major National Academy of Sciences
(“NAS”) studies7 of risk assessment and in the recent report of the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management.8
This Article also draws on nearly thirty years of experience with the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) to advocate the adoption
of a pragmatic approach to risk assessment.

Harm”: A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 Ecology
L.Q. 379 (1993).
4. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 99 U. Ill. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 1999); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA’s Critics and
Regulatory Reform, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 587, 611–22 (1996) (expressing the concern
that regulatory “improvement” was not the only motivation with Occupational Safety and
Health Act).
5. For excellent summaries of the costs and benefits of risk assessment, see
McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 4; Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 Admin.
L. Rev. 7, 16–33 (1998).
6. In the pithy phrase of one experienced observer, risk assessment is “not ready for
prime time.” McGarity, supra note 5, at 32.
7. National Research Council, Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment
of Risks to Public Health, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the
Process (1983) [hereinafter Red Book]; National Research Council, Understanding Risk:
Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (1996) [hereinafter Understanding Risk];
National Research Council, Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants,
Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994) [hereinafter Science and Judgment in
Risk Assessment]; National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989).
8. Presidential/Congressional Comm’n on Risk Assessment and Management, Risk
Assessment and Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making (1997) [hereinafter
Presidential/Congressional Comm’n].
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The pragmatic approach, because it focuses on the limitations of the
risk assessment methodology, urges extra caution when approaching legislation that would mandate the use of risk assessment for a broad range
of administrative actions. Three particularly important concerns appear
throughout this Article. First, legislative requirements must be flexible
enough to account for the wide variety of federal regulation (traffic accidents, radiation leaks, ditch cave-ins, habitat protection, and toxic air
emissions), for the varying levels of availability and reliability of underlying data, and for developments in risk assessment methodology itself.
Second, since these requirements inevitably entail a greater investment of
government time and money to carry out protective legislation, they
should be carefully framed to assure that the expense and delay do not
overwhelm the value they add to the regulatory process. Third, any new
procedural mandate will result in judicial review, and care must be taken
to maintain an appropriate relationship between courts and agencies.
NEPA has much to teach in all three of these areas.
Part II of the Article begins with an overview of the role of risk assessment in agency decisionmaking. It discusses in more detail the range
of views within the pragmatic position, that is, on the one hand the limitations of risk assessment, and on the other the changes that would make
it suitable for wider use. Existing risk reform legislation is described in
this context. Part III enumerates eight general guidelines for risk assessment legislation, together with an explanation of their function and purpose. These eight guidelines are summarized in Appendix I. Part IV proposes a model risk assessment procedure. It follows generally the NEPA
environmental impact assessment (“EIA”) process and draws on NEPA
experience to inform risk legislation.

II. Risk Assessment and Agency Decisionmaking: An Overview
Risk assessment has become ubiquitous in the federal government’s
regulation of a wide variety of threats to safety, health, and the quality of
our environment. Risk assessment is a process for calculating the probability and magnitude of identified adverse effects, most commonly excess deaths from cancer caused by exposure to a chemical or radiological
agent. The process is used to identify activities that require regulatory
attention, to select the nature and stringency of an appropriate regulatory
response, and to choose among the many potential objects of regulators’
efforts. Risk assessment aims to “organize and express what can be stated
about risks that are not subject to direct observation and measurement”9
based on an analysis of data concerning toxicity and exposure.
9. Joseph V. Rodricks et al., Significant Risk Decisions in Federal Regulatory Agencies, 7 Regulatory Toxicology & Pharmacology 307, 307 (1987); see also National Oil and
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A 1983 NAS report, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:
Managing the Process (the “Red Book”) set out the general methodology
for human-health-related risk assessment.10 The basic calculation is simple: risk is the product of the toxicity of the hazardous agent and the exposure to it. In the Red Book formulation, quantitative risk assessment
has four steps. First, hazard identification determines whether a substance poses a hazard at all, without measuring in detail its potency or
likely effects. Second, dose-response modeling predicts from testing data
the toxic effect of a given amount of exposure to a given agent. This
phase uses the familiar (and often maligned) large-scale animal bioassays
to reach estimates of toxic potency. To predict dose-response at low levels over long periods, however, the risk assessor must often rely on theoretical models. Choosing among these models can be controversial because the biological mechanisms of toxicity are poorly understood.
The third step, exposure assessment, undertakes to estimate the
amount of the agent with which humans or elements of the environment
are likely to come in contact. A risk assessor is often confronted with
many routes between the hazardous substance and the human or ecological receptor, and extrapolating from exposure to actual dose involves
more modeling of human and animal metabolism. The differing routes of
exposure (ingestion, inhalation, or absorption) and metabolism yield an
additional layer of complexity.11 In addition, to assess the effects of regulatory action, the risk assessor must often predict future physical conditions and human behaviors.
Fourth, risk characterization combines the hazard and exposure
data, and identifies the assumptions and uncertainties within the data. In
the classic version, this process is a quantitative exercise: numerical values are attached to dose-response and exposure, they are multiplied, and
a risk figure—usually expressed as an individual risk (for example, 1 in
1,000,000)—is generated.12 The result is a quantitative evaluation that

Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8709 (1990) (noting that “the purpose of risk assessment in the Superfund program is to provide a framework for developing risk information necessary to assist decisionmaking at remedial sites.
Risk assessment provides a consistent process for evaluating and documenting threats to
human health and the environment posed by hazardous material at sites.”) (codified at 400
C.F.R. pt. 300 (1998)).
10. Red Book, supra note 7. Recent authoritative statements of risk assessment
methodology include Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7; Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8. For excellent discussions of the basis for toxicological risk assessment, see Joseph V. Rodricks, Calculated Risks (1992), and John Harte
et al., Toxics A to Z 15–43 (1991). The methodologies described in these works were primarily designed to fit the mechanisms of and testing methods for human cancer.
11. Radiation, for example, has radically different effects depending on the route of
exposure. Alpha particles are effectively resisted by the skin (dermal exposure), but deadly
in the lung (inhalation). Harte et al., supra note 10, at 144–45.
12. Narrative or qualitative risk assessment is necessary for some types of risk.
Therefore, the recommendation uses the generic term “risk assessment.”
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represents the excess deaths or illnesses expected from exposure to the
toxic substances.
The foregoing steps comprise risk assessment. The Red Book distinguished this process from risk management, the substantive decision
to take or withhold regulatory action. The latter, unlike risk assessment,
explicitly involves political, social, and economic policy questions, such
as the acceptable level of risk and the appropriate regulatory response.13
As a rigid dichotomy, of course, this split is an unrealistic view of government action and of science. Political and judgmental factors pervade
the entire assessment function. Operating in a world of uncertainty, incomplete data, and genuine differences between scientists in interpretation of and inferences from the available data, risk assessors must make
many assumptions and estimates. The choice, for example, among conservative, risk-preferring, or middle-ground assumptions is clearly a policy question.14 Rather than paper over the role of policy in risk assessment, the relationship between risk assessment and risk management
should be acknowledged:
A more subtle and less widely recognized impediment to good decisionmaking on risk arises from a rigid adherence to the principle of
separating risk assessment from risk management. The call to keep
these two functions distinct was originally articulated in response to
a widespread perception that EPA was making judgments on the
risk posed by a particular substance not on the basis of science, but
rather on the basis of its willingness to regulate the substance. The
purpose of separation, however, was not to prevent any exercise of
policy judgment at all when evaluating science or to prevent risk
managers from influencing the type of information that assessors
would collect, analyze, or present. Indeed, the Red Book made it
clear that judgment (also referred to as risk-assessment policy or
science policy) would be required even during the phase of risk assessment. The present committee concludes further that the sciencepolicy judgments that EPA makes in the course of risk assessment
would be improved if they were more clearly informed by the

13. See William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,190 (1984); William D. Ruckelshaus, Science, Risk, and Public Policy, 221 Science 1026, 1027–28 (1983).
14. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
Yale J. on Reg. 89 (1988); David Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be
Converted?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222 (1984); see also Thomas O.
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 736–40
(1979) (defining science policy questions); Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the
Interface Between Science and Law, 14 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 343, 349–53 (1989) (suggesting that risk assessment be seen as a three-step process, the first being “science policy” to
establish assumptions and degree of conservatism).

98

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 23

agency’s priorities and goals in risk management. Protecting the integrity of the risk assessment, while building more productive linkages to make risk assessment more accurate and relevant to risk
management, will be essential as the agency proceeds to regulate
the residual risks of hazardous air pollutants.15
The Red Book’s distinction can be a useful guide for many purposes, as
it separates the analytic input into decisions from the substantive decisions themselves and discloses the location of policy judgements throughout the assessment-management process.
A risk-assessment requirement would in this sense be analogous to
the Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) process in the NEPA, which
mandates no particular substantive result, because the EIS informs but is
clearly distinct from the final agency decision.16 Both risk assessment
and NEPA reflect the often-difficult intersection of law and science.
While the two cannot be separated, it is critical to understand when the
law or science is operating to form policy.

A. The Risk Assessment Controversy
The use of risk assessment in environmental decisionmaking has
been controversial.17 It is impossible in a few pages to summarize fairly,
or even to cover competently, the subject of countless books, articles,
commissions, organizations, reports, and journals. At the risk of caricature, however, the contending views (usually expressed by environmental
and economic development advocates, respectively18) are described below to place the issues in their proper context.19

15. Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 259–60.
16. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348–53 (1989)
(interpreting NEPA). But see Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of
the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 203 (1998); Paul S.
Weiland, Amending the National Environmental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 12 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 275 (1997).
17. See supra note 3.
18. There is overlap between these categories as well as the respective criticisms of
risk assessment.
19. Other summaries of the contending views can be found in McGarity, A CostBenefit State, supra note 5, at 16–32; Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing
the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 43–75 (1995); and John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental DecisionMaking, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1643, 1657–65 (1995) [hereinafter Applegate, A Beginning and
Not an End].
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1. The Limitations of Risk Assessment
Opponents of risk-assessment requirements believe that quantified
risk imperfectly expresses the degree of concern that should attach to a
particular problem because risk has many meanings that must be disaggregated.20 Most toxic risk assessments focus on one outcome (death) of
one type of disease (cancer) in one species (humans). However, even
within the purview of human health, there are many possible endpoints:
teratogenicity (birth defects), non-cancer deaths, cancer that does not
cause death, neurological damage, breathing difficulty, ad infinitum.21 To
the extent that workers voluntarily encounter such risks in return for
payment, occupationally encountered risks are different from other
risks.22
Furthermore, people may be more risk averse than risk neutral. One
would certainly infer this point from the legal standards contained in environmental and health statutes.23 The general public has a strong tendency to focus more on the severity of the possible consequence than the
relative likelihood of its occurrence, and this approach may not be irrational given the many qualitative differences between individual adverse
effects and a catastrophe.24 Choices about risk reflect legitimate political
responses to consistent human patterns of response to risk. Risk assessment or comparison should inform, not erase, those patterns.
The use of a numerical risk assessment is itself a policy choice that
can overshadow important social and political considerations. Risk assessment has a distinct technical and political allure to regulators and to
industry because it offers an apparently scientific justification for regulatory action (or inaction) that considers other dangers and (through cost-

20. See Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 587–92 (demonstrating that because individuals confront risks in different ways, there is a need for
theoretical guidance); Clayton P. Gillette & James A. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1070–99 (1990); Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform, 8 Fordham Envtl. L.J. 459 (1997).
21. See California Comparative Risk Project, Toward the 21st Century: Planning for
the Protection of California’s Environment 14 (1994); Jonathan Lash, Should We Set Priorities Based in Risk Analysis?, EPA J. Mar./Apr. 1991, at 19.
22. Obviously, there is a spectrum of voluntariness from clearly willing and knowing acceptance of risks (astronauts, oil-well fire fighters) to persons who have little choice
but to accept a job and who understand little of its risks. See John S. Applegate & Steven
M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection, 15
Yale J. on Reg. 269, 307–09 (1998) (discussing the difficulties of comparing occupational
and non-occupational risks).
23. See Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 592–604 (noting that by emphasizing aggregate risk, comparative risk assessment ignores distribution of
risks and specially affected subpopulations).
24. For example, John Wargo criticizes the consideration of exposure levels (and
economic benefits) in pesticide regulation because it “permit[s] continued use of pesticides
that are declared by EPA to be carcinogens.” John Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy
272–73, 303 (1996).
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benefit analysis) the benefits of a particular activity.25 Quantification can
also compound inaccuracies when information is scarce and judgment
must fill the gaps.26 Given these uncertainties, the use of numbers may
imply an unjustified accuracy.27 Quantification may distract attention
from the underlying value choices and obscure fundamental changes that
might avoid the risk-benefit trade-offs altogether.28
Risk assessments are information-intensive exercises. They not only
require information that is frequently unavailable, but they also consume
scarce agency time and resources.29 A required risk-assessment process
will (and may be intended to) slow an already burdensome process for
enacting environmental protections.30 The basic data needed to perform
risk evaluations of chemicals, activities, and sites are severely limited,
and the uncertainties in the extant data are profound.31 Moreover, many
of the required data are in the hands of the regulated entities whose incentives for full disclosure and aggressive pursuit of new information are
limited.32 Risk-assessment requirements, therefore, commit the federal
25. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 277–84 (1991) (describing reasons for the adoption of risk assessment) [hereinafter Applegate, Unreasonable
Risk]; Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 565–84 (describing the
“allure” of science, rationality, and synoptic analytical techniques).
26. Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems 2–4 (1987) [hereinafter Unfinished Business]; Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 80–84.
27. See Frank P. Grad, Risk Assessment and the Tyranny of Numbers, 1 J. Envtl. L.
& Litig. 1 (1986).
28. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 369 (1993)
[hereinafter Hornstein, Federal Pesticide Regulation]; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra
note 3 at 323–24, 330 (“[T]he gulf is not between facts and values, but between valueladen facts and fact-laden values.”); David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform,
95 Colum. L. Rev. 1857, 1871 (1995) (book review) (describing such trade-offs as
“Sophie’s choice,” quoting Worst Things First? The Debate over Risk-Based National
Environmental Priorities 89 (Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding eds., 1994)) [hereinafter
Worst Things First?]; Shere, supra note 2, at 410–17.
29. In this respect, it parallels the regulatory demands of the “unreasonable risk” or
acceptable risk standard in environmental toxics statutes, the increasing use of which encouraged the development of quantitative risk assessment. See Applegate, Unreasonable
Risk, supra note 25, at 267–77.
30. For example, in cases such as Gulf South Insulation v. CPSC, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th
Cir. 1983) (vacating rule), and Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1991) (vacating regulation), the Fifth Circuit took a hard look at the agencies’ risk data and
analysis even in the absence of a formal risk assessment requirement.
31. See National Academy of Sciences, Toxicity Testing: Strategies to Determine
Needs and Priorities 205 (1984) [hereinafter Toxicity Testing] (“The information available
. . . is scanty, and the resources available . . . do not suffice to test all chemicals for every
possible health effect.”); Office of Technology Assessment, Complex Cleanup: The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production 62–64 (1991) [hereinafter Complex
Cleanup] (asserting that “credible data needed for evaluation has not been attained”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and
Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 5 (1989).
32. See Wargo, supra note 24, at 275–78; Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 773 (1997); Mary L. Lyndon, In-
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government to a lengthy and expensive regulatory burden in which the
regulated community has distinct advantages.33 As Howard Latin has put
it, “[a]ny requirement that environmental regulation must be based on
‘good science’ is not a neutral principle in areas where information scarcity is endemic and no reasonable scientific consensus exists.”34
Requirements to compare risks exaggerate the foregoing problems.35
As discussed below in more detail, risk has many more dimensions than
numerical likelihood of fatal cancer in humans. To compare different
hazards—dioxin-contaminated effluent from paper mills, workplace accidents, medical radiation, wetlands destruction, and abandoned landfills—by a single metric may help to place the risks in perspective, but it
does so at the cost of rendering invisible the important differences among
them.36 Even within the human cancer metric, risk comparison requires
the development of expensive data for several risks even when only one
is under regulatory consideration. This requirement inevitably makes the
development of a regulation far more expensive and time-consuming,
and less regulation will result.
In the skeptics’ view, risk assessment is part and parcel of a general
tendency to reduce public safety and health problems to simplistic calculations. Risk assessment resembles cost-benefit analysis, in which important values like human life and suffering or biodiversity have to be represented as numerical values such as dollar figures.37 Risk assessment, esformation Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data,
87 Mich. L. Rev. 1795, 1796–99 (1989) [hereinafter Lyndon, Information Economics and
Chemical Toxicity].
33. See Toxicity Testing, supra note 31, at 205; John S. Applegate, Worst Things
First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances Control, 9 Yale J.
on Reg. 277, 309–28 (1992) [hereinafter Applegate, Worst Things First] (proposing a way
to require less information in order to address the scarcity of information in risk assessment); Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32, at 1795,
1796–99; Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic Substances Control: CostEffective Information Development for the Control of Environmental Carcinogens, 27 Pub.
Pol. 333, 333 (1979).
34. Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1329
(1985).
35. For an introduction to these issues and the numerous points of view on them, see
Comparing Environmental Risks: Tools for Setting Governmental Priorities (J. Clarence
Davies ed., 1996); Risk versus Risk (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, 1995);
Worst Things First? supra note 28; Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note
2; John S. Applegate, Comparative Risk Assessment and Environmental Priorities Projects: A Forum, Not a Formula, 25 N. Ky. L. Rev. 71, 81–87 (1997) [hereinafter Applegate, Comparative Risk Assessment].
36. This is a universal concern about comparative risk assessment. See, e.g., M.
Granger Morgan, Quantitative Risk Ranking: More Promise than the Critics Suggest, in
Worst Things First? supra note 28, at 133–45; Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 3, at
330; Wirth & Silbergeld, supra note 28, at 1875–77; Michael S. Baram, Use of Comparative Risk Methods in Regulatory and Common Law, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 12 (1987).
37. A relatively strict version of cost-benefit analysis was required in President
Reagan’s Executive Order No. 12,291. President Clinton’s more flexible model replaced it
in Executive Order No. 12,866.
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pecially quantitative risk assessment, undeniably fits well with costbenefit analysis, as the benefits side of the analysis can be characterized
as reduction of risk. However useful such analyses are in theory, their
oversimplification of the issues at stake renders them misleading and
subject to abuse.
2. Assumptions and Conservatism
The proponents of risk-assessment requirements have their own
criticisms of risk assessment as currently practiced. However, unlike the
foregoing arguments, these critiques aim to perfect what is regarded as a
fundamentally sound and valuable analytical technique.
Because the mechanisms of cancer are poorly understood, and because the routes of exposure from environment to target organ are so
numerous and complex that they are also poorly defined, risk assessment
perennially suffers from uncertainty and lack of sufficient data. These
gaps in understanding must be filled with estimates and assumptions.38
Advocates of risk assessment often criticize such models for using conservative assumptions that overstate risks in the interest of erring on the
side of safety.
Some such assumptions concern the toxicity of substances. It is
typical, at least in the absence of conclusive evidence to the contrary, to
assume that a carcinogen has no “threshold” concentration below which
it poses no risk of causing cancer.39 This assumption may or may not be
confirmed by existing study data, but the existing data rarely demonstrate
a clear threshold at very low doses. Therefore, the conservative or precautionary approach assumes no threshold exists. Likewise, in calculating dose, assumptions are made about the conversion factor for translating the results of animal testing to humans, and, in fact, the use of animal
models at all contains the assumption (also controversial40) that they are
relevant to human effects. These kinds of assumptions are scientifically
justified in that there is an empirical or theoretical basis for them and that
there is not a clear demonstration to the contrary, but it is also a policy
choice to adopt, in the face of uncertainty, the conservative position.41
38. The Red Book anticipates many of these issues in its discussion of the need for
“inference guidelines.” Red Book, supra note 7, at 51–85.
39. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (upholding EPA’s presumption under the Safe Drinking Water Act that the
only “safe” level of a carcinogen is zero).
40. The Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, for example,
bans food additives that are carcinogenic “in man or animal,” whereas the Agent Orange
case dismissed animal studies as largely irrelevant to proving toxic causation in humans.
21 U.S.C. § 348 (C)(3)(A) (1994) (emphasis added); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
41. See Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7 (explaining justifications for conservative assumptions); Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too
Conservative?: Revising the Revisionists, 14 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 427 (1989); Talbot Page,
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It is also a policy choice to adopt multiple conservative assumptions
in risk assessment, by choosing the conservative assumption each time
that a data gap is encountered.42 The intended result of multiple conservatism is to overstate risk.43 Risk assessment advocates argue that it is poor
practice to base regulatory decisions—especially ones with serious economic and risk consequences—on knowingly inflated figures. On the
other hand, Congress and the general public seem to endorse the general
policy position of precaution and protectiveness. Further, if risk assessors
truly do not know what the actual values should be, it is entirely possible
that the results all fall on the wrong end of the spectrum.
In exposure assessment, the typical unknown is not so much uncertainty as variability. The rate of dermal absorption of a chemical can be
established with some degree of accuracy, but it may differ significantly
among individuals. Similarly, children ingest soil at a playground and
adults drink water from a groundwater source, but there will be considerable variation in the amount of soil ingested or water drunk, based on the
amount of time spent at the location and the particular habits of each person. Such variation applies to groups as well. Some segments of the
population eat more fish than others, placing them at higher risk from
environmental contaminants that find their way into fish. Again, the standard practice is to choose the conservative or precautionary assumption,
that is, to choose the value that lies at the high end of the exposure spectrum. Like the toxicity assumptions, this decision deliberately errs on the
side of safety by overstating the extent of exposure to hazardous substances. Thus, given a range of possible exposure values, the assessor
chooses a point estimate at the high end of the range, which is presumed
to protect 95 to 99%, or more, of the population. The frequently relied
upon “maximally exposed individual,” for example, possesses characteristics designed to assure that almost no one in the world could be more
exposed. If the risks to such a hypothetical person fall within acceptable
limits, the idea goes, then a risk assessor can be confident that real people are protected.
To the extent that dose-response estimates are based on a series of
high-end values or that hypothetical individuals do not reflect the likely
exposure patterns in the foreseeable and long-term futures, such assumptions have been regularly challenged as deliberately counterfactual and

A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Ecology L.Q. 207, 224–25 (1978)
(discussing the reasons for adopting worst-case or upper-bound estimates).
42. This policy was upheld as a matter of statutory interpretation under the Clean
Air Act in Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980).
43. Compare Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 851 (1996) (criticizing undue conservatism), with Page, supra note
41, at 233–36 (justifying worst case estimates by analogy to the problem of false negatives).
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the resulting risk estimates as exaggerated.44 The estimates represent the
worst, rather than the expected, case—an issue familiar from the 1986
revision of NEPA regulations to eliminate the requirement of worst-case
scenarios in environmental impact statements.45 Deliberate inaccuracy
makes a weak basis for policymaking, even though protectiveness is
clearly a legitimate motivation. Inaccuracy can also lead to unnecessarily
expensive management decisions, which becomes particularly problematic when dealing with finite government resources. The inaccuracy is
further exacerbated when conservative assumptions are employed to
compute costs for handling the “last 10%,” the most expensive increment
of regulation.46
One response to undue conservatism relies on the use of “best estimates” or average values in making assumptions. Unfortunately, the lack
of information is often so profound that risk assessors do not have a
“best.” Simply choosing an average is little better, as an average value
represents no more than a guess at the actual value.47 Such uses of averages have been analogized to estimating a professional athlete’s salary by
taking the average of all professional players48—where variation is great,
the single figure will be highly misleading.49
Another response is to abandon the practice of using point estimates
in risk assessments in favor of ranges of estimates. If the most accurate
expression of the actual knowledge of the risk is a range of risks, decisionmakers and the public ought not to make important decisions believing that the risk has a specific value when it might well be much greater
or lower. A refinement of risk ranges seeks to assign probabilities to each
part of the range through a statistical technique called “Monte Carlo”
analysis, in which the known variation in the various components of the
44. On the other hand, if the exaggeration is fully disclosed, users of the risk assessment can adjust their understanding of the results accordingly. Risk averse users will
take them at face value to provide a margin of safety; risk neutral users will discount them.
See, e.g., Contra Costa County v. Pena, 1998 WL 164966, *3, *7–*8 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(approving agency’s decision not to follow “upper bound” risk values); Sierra Club v. Utah
Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board, 964 P.2d 335, 341–44 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(approving agency’s discounting of explicitly “overstated” risk assessment results); Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1654–55 (describing citizens advisory
board’s use of high-end results).
45. See National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,618, 15,618–26 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1502) (1986) (final
rule). The Supreme Court affirmed the Council on Environmental Quality’s (“CEQ”) rejection of worst-case analyses in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
354–56 (1989).
46. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
10–19 (1993).
47. See Latin, supra note 14 (criticizing, from an environmentalist’s perspective, the
choice of default values in EPA’s carcinogen guidelines).
48. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, supra note 5, at 28.
49. The toxicity variation has been memorably described as “not knowing whether
one has enough money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national debt.” C. Richard
Cothern et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 111, 115 (1986).
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risk calculation are combined repeatedly in random combinations to get a
sense of the most likely final values.50 The output is, instead of a single
point value for exposure or simply the range of possible values, a distribution curve showing the relative likelihood of values.
A final response to undue conservatism is to insist on full disclosure. Since risk assessment is a tool to making fully informed policy decisions, the exponential character of compiling conservative assumptions
should be disclosed to the public and made available to the decisionmaker.

B. Risk Legislation
It may seem odd that the major pieces of regulatory reform legislation before Congress do not address the substantive problems that such
legislation seeks to cure. Instead this legislation focuses on a particular
analytical technique. The explanation probably lies in the relative stability of the substantive legal standards in most environmental, safety, and
health regulation. The “unreasonable risk” standard in the Toxic Substances Control Act,51 the zero-risk standard for food additives (pesticides excepted) in the Delaney Clause,52 the feasibility standard in the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”),53 and their counterparts
in other statutes,54 have all resisted fundamental change for years or decades.55
As a result, the battleground on regulation has moved from standards to the methods for calculating them.56 As risk assessment has assumed central importance to federal regulators in calculating the pre- and
post-regulation conditions that they must address, it is natural that risk
50. For a thorough and accessible discussion of Monte Carlo analysis, see Susan R.
Poulter, Monte Carlo Simulation in Environmental Risk Assessment—Science, Policy and
Legal Issues, 9 Risk 7 (1998).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994).
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(3) (1994).
54. See Applegate, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 25, at 267–71 (describing the generic “unreasonable risk” standard).
55. The recent amendments to the Delaney Clause, see Food Quality Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.),
and the air toxics section of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 7412, simply highlight the point. While the obviously arbitrary differentiation between pesticide
standards and the notoriously dysfunctional hazardous air pollutant provisions were modified, the core standards for each remained unchanged. The 1996 amendments, Pub. L. No.
104-182, 110 Stat. 1613 (1996), to the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (f–j),
were likewise incremental.
56. Others have noted the Congressional tendency to focus on the means rather than
the ends in its oversight of social regulation and have attributed the tendency to the difficulty of reaching agreement on goals. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 25–26 (1994) [hereinafter
Shapiro, Political Oversight].

106

Harvard Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 23

assessment should become the subject of Congressional attention. The
allure for those legislators who believe that federal regulation is often
unnecessarily rigid and stringent, even to the point of irrationality, is that
risk assessment offers an opportunity to achieve greater flexibility and
moderation without changing the underlying, politically durable substantive standards.
Several risk assessment reform bills have been introduced in Congress as a way to moderate the impact of the underlying legislation. The
103rd Congress saw bills that required additional use of risk-assessment
methodologies, but none, except for a modest requirement in the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act, was enacted.57 Riskassessment bills in the 104th Congress were legion.58 Some, such as
H.R. 9,59 H.R. 1022,60 and S. 343,61 were wide-ranging regulatory reform
efforts that imposed an array of analytical and procedural requirements
on regulatory decisionmaking. Others, such as S. 333,62 were limited to
risk assessment and emphasized the careful use of limited resources.
None passed Congress; however, relatively modest risk assessment provision was successfully inserted into the revisions of the Safe Drinking
Water Act.63
The principal risk proposal in the 105th Congress was the LevinThompson bill, S. 981.64 As amended,65 it was a compromise measure that
won bipartisan support. A bill by Senator Thompson (without Levin)—
sporting not one but two new euphemisms for risk-cost-benefit analysis,
57. 7 U.S.C. § 2204(e) (1994) (establishing an Office of Risk Assessment and CostBenefit Analysis in the Department of Agriculture).
58. For a detailed review of the 104th Congress bills, see Robert M. Simon, Issues
in Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis and Their Relationship to Regulatory Reform, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1611 (1995).
59. 104th Cong. (1995). H.R. 9 was part of the so-called Contract with America,
which included among its goals limiting federal regulation partly through additional procedural requirements. See Bob Benenson, House Easily Passes Bills to Limit Regulations,
53 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 679, 681–82 (1995) (quoting House Rules Committee Chairman
Gerald Solomon, “For years, business and industry have been forced to jump through
hoops to satisfy regulators in the bureaucracy. Well, if this legislation becomes law, we are
going to turn that around.”). For further discussion of this point, see Wagner, Congress,
Science, and Environmental Policy, supra note 4.
60. 104th Cong. (1995). The bill originated as Title III of H.R. 9, but was later severed to make passage easier.
61. 104th Cong. (1995). Introduced by Senator Robert Dole, S. 343, together with
Amendment No. 229, is styled as an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551. (1988), and covers approximately the same territory as H.R. 9.
62. 104th Cong. (1995). S. 333 was limited in scope to risk assessment and to the
environmental restoration activities of the Department of Energy. Id. § 4(a). It is modeled
on legislation introduced by Senator Johnston in the 103d Congress. Senators Murkowski
and Lott also proposed Amendment No. 230, which would have expanded the application
of S. 333 to all environmental regulation and add a provision for judicial review. Amend.
No. 230, 104th Cong. (§§ 622, 627) (1995) (proposed by Sen. Murkowski and Sen. Lott).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
64. 105th Cong. (1997).
65. S. 1644, 105th Cong. (1998) (reported out of committee Mar. 10, 1998).
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“regulatory right-to-know” and “regulatory accounting statement”—
would require the agency to “present the most plausible level of risk
practical.”66 Again, none of these bills passed Congress.
There are a number of elements in these bills that can be expected to
appear in proposals for legislation in the 106th Congress. Appendix II
summarizes the provisions and their locations. For clarity, Appendix II
contrasts the broader anti-regulation bills of the 104th Congress with the
compromise version in the 105th Congress. It also compares these with
the elements of President Clinton’s Executive Order No. 12,866 and the
Clinton Administration’s Risk Principles.67
Most legislative proposals to require risk assessments were drafted
as amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act. While a logical location for an analytical tool and an addition to the procedures to be followed in administrative action, it understates the substantive significance
of risk assessment. Even if the requirement to perform formal risk assessments is strictly procedural like NEPA, it is clearly designed to have
an impact on the outcome of decisions under those legal standards. So,
like NEPA, a risk-assessment requirement should have a separate identity
to highlight its substantive as well as procedural significance for health,
safety, and environmental regulation.

III. The Draft Guidelines
This Part sets out the basic principles that underlie the proposed
Guidelines and together lay out a vision of the function of risk assessment in the regulatory decisionmaking process. Briefly stated, the Guidelines rest on the view that risk assessment can be an important and useful
tool in analyzing the regulatory proposals of agencies of the federal government, but that risk assessment, like any serious tool, must be employed only for appropriate tasks, practiced by skilled persons, and always used with care.
The proposed Guidelines also seek to reflect what might be called
the consensus state of the art of risk assessment, as embodied in the most
recent of the National Academy of Sciences’ major reports on risk assessment, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994) and Understanding Risk (1996); the report of the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Risk Assessment and
66. S. 2161, 105th Cong. § 4(d)(2) (1998).
67. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 §§ 3(f), 6(a) (1993); Dep’t of
Energy, Risk Assessment, Management, and Communication and Priority Setting (1995),
reprinted in Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1675–77. The Risk
Principles were drafted by an interagency group under the auspices of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and formally adopted by the Department of Energy for use in
its sizable environmental remediation program.
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Risk Management in Regulatory Decision-Making (1997); EPA’s Guidance for Risk Characterization (1995) and Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment (1996)68; and the Administration’s Risk Principles (1995). The proposal attempts to account for important criticisms of
risk-assessment practices, particularly when they can be fairly reflected as
caveats to the general consensus position. The recommendation does not
deliberately track, nor does it endorse, specific legislative proposals,
though the amended Levin-Thompson bill69 is for the most part consistent
with the recommendation.
1. Risk assessment considers an important and useful but not comprehensive set of information relevant to regulatory decisions.
Even the earliest statements of the risk-assessment methodology
cautioned: “Risk assessment is only one aspect of the process of regulatory control of hazardous substances.”70 This caveat becomes increasingly important as regulators direct risk assessment toward areas that do
not involve hazardous substances. Even so, a quick glance at federal environmental statutes reveals that human health risk is not the only goal
served by the environmental statutes, and the statutes do not exclude
non-risk considerations in setting standards.71 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”) requires remedial actions to be “protective of human health
and the environment,”72 as do virtually all of the other major environmental statutes. Ecosystem damage is not only an entirely different type
of risk from human health,73 but it also implicates other important values,
such as respect for nature or the unique qualities of individual species
and habitats, that are not captured by risk per se. Likewise, aquifers are
not only a potential pathway of exposure to hazards, they are also an important resource whose integrity should be protected. Whether or not
regulators can discern some long-term tangible human benefit from natural resources and ecosystems, their protection is firmly embedded in
United States environmental law and policy.

68. See Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,552,
47,555–56 (1996) (describing function of risk assessment) [hereinafter PGERA].
69. See supra note 65.
70. Red Book, supra note 7, at 48; see also Richard A. Merrill, Federal Regulation
of Cancer-Causing Chemicals, in 2 Administrative Conference of the United States: Recommendations and Reports 21 (1982) (outlining federal regulation of cancer-causing
chemicals).
71. See Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
73. The methods for evaluating ecological risk parallel those for human health risk,
but they are necessarily more general and comprehensive, covering both more species and
more stressors. See generally PGERA, supra note 68 (proposing a method that is drawn
from chemical risk assessment).
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Similarly, cultural and historical values may inform our understanding of what requires regulatory attention, how much, and when. For example, at the Department of Energy’s Hanford site in eastern Washington, soil and groundwater contamination put Native Americans at risk in
their subsistence and religious use of parts of the site. Given the history
of unconcern for Native American traditions, one justifiable policy might
be restoring such areas despite relatively low quantified risks. Further,
the relatively amorphous concerns of quality of life and public anxiety
ought to be considered,74 though perhaps not as a dominant factor. Emotional distress is often the major item of damages in a toxic tort suit,75
and anxiety may be the day-to-day effect of unremedied environmental
risks. Culpability also has great relevance to the need for action.76 There
is a world of difference, as radon abatement programs have shown, between reactions to a naturally occurring substance in the home and, say,
chemical emissions from nearby industries. In the case of polluted federal facilities, the fundamental wrongness of a government agency poisoning the environment and putting at risk the health of the people whom
it serves creates a moral imperative for remedial action not captured by
risk assessment alone.77
As the environmental justice movement has made clear, risks are
not distributed evenly across the population. Wealth, race, neighborhood,
advanced age, and infancy can all make significant differences in susceptibility and degree of exposure.78 Health risks cannot be completely characterized without considering specially impacted subpopulations, “hot
spots” of multiple exposure, highly exposed persons, or even identifiable
individuals.79 Distribution may be unequal across time as well—what we
put off today, we impose on our children—so intergenerational equity
should be a concern.80 Intergenerational responsibility creates a moral
74. See California Comparative Risk Project, supra note 21, at 33–36 (examining
the impact of environmental problems on “social welfare”).
75. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1202 (6th Cir. 1988)
(awarding damages for post-traumatic stress disorder and emotional suffering).
76. See Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1662.
77. This imperative is reflected in Congressional inclusion of federal facilities in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and CERCLA, and in the enactment
of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994), which allows states to
fine the federal government for RCRA violations.
78. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 116–29 (describing methodological inadequacies in
standard risk assessment techniques).
79. See Complex Cleanup supra note 31, at 63 (criticizing the Department of Energy’s assessment plan because it failed to consider multiple contaminants or identify the
“most exposed individual”); Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at
592–95 (criticizing “hard” comparative risk assessment that only evaluates how many
people will suffer); Wargo, supra note 24, at 172–248 (documenting the heightened susceptibility of children to toxic substances, due to differences in physiology and diet, and
criticizing the use of averages in data that fail to reflect variance in susceptibility).
80. See Nat’l. Academy of Pub. Admin., Deciding for the Future: Balancing Risks,
Costs, and Benefits Fairly Across Generations (1997); Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to
Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity
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mandate to address problems that are modest now but will significantly
worsen over time.
Regulatory decisions regularly hinge on factors other than health.
Cost, values, overarching policies, and administrative feasibility all have
a place in risk management, so risk assessment ought not to be the sole
criterion for regulatory decisions. The extent of the available information, the tractability of a problem,81 and the administrability of the remedy82 are also relevant. An environmental regulator should always be looking for fundamental changes in processes or products that would remedy
several environmental problems at once or would anticipate and prevent
problems.83 Risk legislation should not make risk the dominant analytical
test to the exclusion of the foregoing factors.
2. The purpose of risk assessment is to gather, analyze, organize,
and present relevant information; it should not itself be an argument for
or dictate a particular substantive outcome.
The Red Book distinguished between risk assessment and risk management as a way to encourage analysis to be as outcome-neutral as possible and to make explicit the policy choices in the risk management
phase. While the reality and desirability of the assessment-management
distinction has been assailed, the combination of seeking unbiased input
and candid decisions seems an appropriate goal of a regulatory decisionmaking system.84 Risk assessment provides a framework in which to
organize and focus attention on a wide range of relevant data. Clearly,
assumptions and policy choices within risk assessment must be fully disclosed and explained, but once that is done, the information is usually
highly pertinent.

5–45 (1989) (describing the planet as a “global commons” shared by all generations and
contending that law should reflect this viewpoint).
81. See Adam Finkel, Do We Know Enough to Take a Risk-Based Approach?, EPA
J., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 38 (“the most sophisticated ranking of risks and benefits will be a
vain exercise unless EPA is committed to controlling even the small risks when the solution is cheap or economically beneficial and dedicated to searching for new ways to ameliorate what seem to be large but intractable risks.”)
82. See Merrill, supra note 70, at 114–17 (“Agencies should not shrink from contested proceedings when health risks are high, but they should consider their ability to
enforce any formal limit they set.”).
83. See Hornstein, Federal Pesticide Regulation, supra note 28, at 405–06 (articulating a “cause-oriented approach” to environmental law reform that would focus on incentives to cause environmental problems and the role that disincentives could play in solving
them); Bernard D. Goldstein, If Risk Management Is Broke, Why Fix Risk Assessment?,
EPA J. Jan./Mar. 1993, at 23 (“While continuing to emphasize risk assessment as a means
to prioritize the approach to existing problems, EPA needs to assign a high level of priority
to the much more cost-effective approach of anticipating and preventing new environmental problems.”).
84. The Red Book’s authors harbored no illusions about the absoluteness of the distinction, but saw it as a desirable aspiration. See Red Book, supra note 7, at 18–19.
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However, risk information does not and should not dictate the outcome of the regulatory process. Additional information, policy considerations, and arguments should go into the final decision. For example, Dale
Hattis proposes four values that health and safety regulation should embody: fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits, fairness in decisionmaking, effectiveness, and the principle “first, do no harm.”85 All of
these values require risk information to be analyzed, but none are fully
determined by that analysis.86 Efforts to make the results of risk assessments dispositive for regulatory decisions or priorities would not only
blur the difference between analysis and decision, but would altogether
miss the important elements described above. Put another way, regulatory decisions in the areas of health, safety, and the environment should
be risk-informed, but not necessarily risk-determined.
The idea of a “supermandate”—that is, including in risk legislation
a requirement that the risk-reduction benefits of a regulatory measure
outweigh its costs in all health, safety, and environmental regulations87—
does not in principle run afoul of the risk assessment-management distinction. However, the proposed Guidelines reject this approach for several reasons. First, it is unwise to set out a single substantive standard for
all regulation in the multifarious areas of federal activity without a full
inquiry into the important differences among the various areas. Second,
while the differences in the substantive standards in the different pieces
of legislation can be frustrating and occasionally lead to conflicts among
statutory schemes, the statutory standards were written purposefully, and
it is highly unlikely that, upon investigation, those reasons will be found
to be misguided. Third, the use of an apparently procedural requirement
in an administrative procedure statute is a disingenuous way to effect a
substantive change in a vast range of legislation that enjoys widespread
popular support. While many observers are frustrated with the inability to
obtain reform of the substantive legal standards, a sub rosa assault via
administrative procedures undermines democratic debate.
3. Risk assessment requirements must allow for flexibility to account for a variety of applications of the tool—safety as well as health,
acute risks as well as chronic ones—and for developments in methodology and scientific knowledge. Risk assessors should exercise their professional but be subject to the requirements of identifying and explaining
their judgements. Peer review should be limited to discrete issues upon
which there is considerable disagreement, uncertainty, or other difficulty.

85. Dale Hattis, Drawing the Line: Quantitative Criteria for Risk Management,
Env’t., July/Aug. 1996, at 10,36–38.
86. Id.
87. H.R. 9 § 422(a) and S. 343 § 623(a)(1) included supermandate provisions.
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Whatever its limitations and policy content, risk assessment remains
a fairly new scientific methodology. Like all sciences, it will and should
grow and change over time, and it depends on the professional judgment
of its practitioners. Risk assessment is a changing field with new methods, new science, and new information constantly developing, all of
which should be evaluated before being adopted or discarded. Professional judgment best fits the technique to the situation. For example, an
analytical framework based on human carcinogens may well make little
sense for non-carcinogens or for non-chemical stressors on a critical
habitat. Indeed, the Red Book paradigm may make no sense at all for
mechanical accidents in which the effects are deterministic rather than
stochastic or statistical. For these reasons, one size in risk-assessment
methodology does not fit all situations, and there should be a considerable degree of flexibility in the choice of method and its application. The
role of the law, therefore, should be to protect that flexibility and development, and not to constrain the practice of risk assessment to one
model.88 As Justice Breyer recently said, “The practice of science depends on sound law—law that at a minimum supports science by offering
the scientist breathing space.”89
The expertise to develop and apply analytical methods resides individually in professional risk assessors. It resides institutionally in the
agencies that use risk assessments. Agencies use risk assessment for several different regulatory purposes and apply them to thousands of different potential hazards. The best understanding of the particular needs of
the substantive area of regulation resides in the relevant agency. Therefore, the imposition of uniform, detailed guidance for all risk assessments (either in legislation or by a centralizing agency like the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”)) should be approached with great
caution.90 The agency making the decision should retain the ultimate responsibility for the choice of method and the information that goes into
it.
The use of peer review should be subject to Guideline Seven; that
is, it should match the significance and difficulty of the issue. A blanket
requirement that all risk assessments be reviewed would simply add another stage and new expense to routine risk assessments without commensurate value being added to the final product, especially when critics
of the assessment already have the opportunity to participate as suggested by the Guidelines. Delay and expense—both of which limit regu88. This danger of freezing current analytical techniques in place has been used as
an argument against any legislative risk assessment requirement. See Junius C. McElveen,
Jr. & Chris Amantea, Legislating Risk Assessment, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1553 (1995).
89. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Science 537, 537
(1998).
90. The track record on congressional micromanagement is generally thought to be
poor. See Shapiro, Political Oversight, supra note 56, at 25–26.
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latory output—systematically benefit the subjects of regulation, at least
when the agency has the burden of going forward and of justifying its
actions. Therefore, without commensurate value being added to the final
product, a blanket requirement of peer review would simply stymie
agency action under protective social legislation.
In the risk assessment reform bills, the commitment to broad peer
review requirements as the guarantor of “sound science” in risk assessment is, interestingly, either a rather contingent position or one which
divides the Republican Party membership. In the debate over acid rain
legislation, in which industry and the Republican political position opposed significant further regulation, peer reviewed science (which suggested the existence of an acid rain problem) was regularly characterized
as the problem, not the solution. Representative George E. Brown, Jr., the
ranking Democrat on the House committee investigating the issue, described the Republican members’ position as follows:
Subcommittee Members were quite comfortable both in enthusiastically accepting the policy pronouncements of “skeptic” scientists
and in demeaning the careful peer-review efforts of traditional scientists. Peer review was almost flippantly dismissed as politically
correct tyranny, as opposed to the true scientific breakthroughs generated by the unconventional and skeptical innovator.91
Peer review is neither inherently good nor bad, but its advocacy or rejection may reflect political expediency as well as the search for truth.92 In
accordance with the current practice of several agencies, peer review
should therefore be limited to discrete issues upon which there is considerable disagreement, uncertainty, or other difficulty.93
4. Risk assessments must explicitly acknowledge and explain the
limitations of the process in terms of methodology, data, assumptions,
uncertainty, variability, and qualitative characteristics of risk. Thus,
agencies should use qualitative risk assessments when uncertainty or the
91. George E. Brown, Jr., Environmental Science Under Siege: Fringe Science and
the 104th Congress, Report to the Democratic Caucus of the Comm. on Science, U.S.
House of Representatives (1996); see also George E. Brown, Jr., Environmental Science
Under Siege in the U.S. Congress, Env’t., Mar. 1997, at 12.
This episode is described as part of a comprehensive treatment of the congressional
use and misuse of science in Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, supra
note 4.
92. For some, expense and delay were apparently the main purposes of these requirements, see supra note 59 (describing H.R. 9 and quoting Rep. Solomon).
93. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation,
17 Ecology L.Q. 1, 63–65 (1990) (discussing current practice); see also Sidney A. Shapiro,
Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures: Evaluating the FDA’s Public
Board of Inquiry, 1986 Duke L.J. 288, 305 n.122; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA, supra note 31, at 35–36 (discussing then-current FDA practice).
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qualitative aspects of risk predominate. Direct evidence of risks should
be used when it is available and reliable; otherwise, it is appropriate to
use standardized, protective “default” assumptions.
The data do not exist to support firm quantitative descriptions of
most environmental problems.94 For example, the data do not exist to
evaluate fully even the 189 hazardous air pollutants identified by Congress in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,95 and in 1986, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) could provide “safety assurances”
for only 37 of the 600 active ingredients in registered pesticides.96 This
“data gap” could to some extent be remedied by massive spending on
data generation and gathering, but such a program would still leave a
substantial area of uncertainty which results from our incomplete scientific understanding of the effects of pollutants in the environment. Moreover, many risk phenomena involve wide ranges of variability. These
gaps and uncertainties must be managed by the use of assumptions and
default values or expressed with risk ranges. It is frequently the case that
regulatory agencies and courts want firm answers from scientists in order
to render and justify important decisions on pressing issues, and it is
tempting to insist on such answers. But certainty and the means of
achieving it cannot be created by statute where it does not otherwise ex94. On the lack of data generally, see Applegate, Unreasonable Risk, supra note 25,
at 284–98; Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32. For
specific situations, see Wargo, Our Children’s Toxic Legacy, supra note 24, at 270–76;
Complex Cleanup, supra note 31, at 62–64; John Chelen, Erasing the Data Deficit, Envtl.
Forum, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 35; Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacturing of Toxic
Products, supra note 32, at 733; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting OSHA, supra note 31, at
5; Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity, supra note 32, at 1796–99. In
its study of carcinogens in the human diet, the NAS concluded:
Numerous and extensive gaps in the current knowledge base were apparent as the
committee endeavored to examine the risk of human cancer from naturally occurring versus synthetic components of the diet. These gaps are so large—and resources are so limited—that careful prioritization of further research efforts is essential. The following recommendations emphasize the need for expanded epidemiologic studies, more human exposure data, improved and enhanced testing methods, more detailed data on dietary components, and further mechanistic studies, if these gaps are to be filled. These research endeavors may prove inadequate, however, when the complexity and variability of diets and
food composition, as well as human behavior, are considered.
National Research Council, Carcinogens and Anticarcinogens in the Human Diet
11–12 (1996). EPA was acutely aware of the problem in its comparative risk studies, see
Unfinished Business, supra note 26, at 14, 35–41; EPA, Science Advisory Board, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection 8 (1990). Moreover, it is a persistent theme of comparative risk critics. See Jonathan Bender, Societal Risk
Reduction: Promise and Pitfalls, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 255 (1995); see also Robin Shifrin,
Note, Not by Risk Alone: Reforming EPA Research Priorities, 102 Yale L.J. 547, 559–65
(1992); Paul A. Locke, The Limitations of Comparative Risk Assessment, 2 Shepard’s Expert & Sci. Evid. 75, 84–90 (1994).
95. Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 144–59.
96. James H. Colopy, Poisoning the Developing World: The Exportation of Unregistered and Severely Restricted Pesticides from the United States, 13 UCLA J. Envtl. L. &
Pol’y 167, 171 nn.18–19 (1995).
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ist. Worse, risk assessment statutes may actually encourage risk assessors
to adopt specific values designed to support, post hoc, the desired outcome.97
The law must not require of science and scientists a degree of apparent certainty or precision that they cannot provide. Proposals to require “best estimates” and “realistic” or “central” assumptions in all
cases make such demands.98 The Safe Drinking Water Act revision, for
example, requires EPA to “specify, to the extent practicable . . . the expected risk or central estimate of risk for specific populations.”99 To some
extent a subsequent requirement to disclose “each appropriate upperbound or lower-bound estimate of risk”100 makes this requirement sensibly display the range of risk values, but it still runs afoul of the fact that
risk assessors often have no real basis for a best estimate. Moreover, to
the extent that “central estimate” means an average or median value, it is
an arbitrary choice without knowing that a symmetrical distribution of
probabilities occurs.
Assumptions and estimates are essential to risk calculations because
of the great uncertainty that surrounds risk assessments. There are many
sources of uncertainty, and the results of the assessment depend upon
their resolution. While extreme or counterfactual scenarios may overstate
the risk, choosing an average value does not necessarily provide the
“right” or even the most probable risk level. Scenarios that are realistic
today do not necessarily account for future conditions, and typical or representative people do not necessarily account for those individuals who
are exposed at significantly higher levels or who have special sensitivities.101
Safety, health, and environmental legislation uniformly make prevention of harm their object, and therefore the use of conservative or protective scenarios falls entirely within that overarching legislative policy.102 With this position in mind, it is best to allow professional risk as97. On the problem of policy masquerading as science, see Shapiro, Biotechnology
and the Design of Regulation, supra note 93, at 65–66; Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA, supra note 31, at 36.
98. See S. 333, 104th Cong. § 3(1) (1995) (defining “best estimate” as “the most
unbiased representation of the most plausible level of risk”); S. 333 Amend. 230, 104th
Cong. § 621(3) (Feb. 3, 1995) (defining “best estimate” to include “[c]entral estimates of
risk using the most plausible assumptions”); H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3107(3) (1995) (same).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1994).
100. Id. § 300g-1(b)(3)(B)(iii) (1994).
101. For example, children have a particular sensitivity to lead. See Lead Industries
Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1138–42, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042
(1980); see also Wargo, supra note 24, at 172–200 (describing the increased susceptibility
of children to environmental toxics). The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 requires
EPA to consider the effects of additives on infants and children when establishing tolerance levels. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
102. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13–28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(finding that Congress intended a Clean Air Act provision to be precautionary in nature
and thus not requiring proof of actual harm before regulating), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
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sessors to choose how to evaluate and express risk, provided that they
thoroughly explain their choices in the risk assessment analysis. Such a
result leaves the user of any given risk assessment with a fuller understanding of the issues and in a better position to make judgments.103 Indeed, standard default values were originally intended to reduce the subjectivity of risk assessment by replacing case-by-case judgments about
the weight of the evidence.104 Moreover, default assumptions are not always too conservative.105 For example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s (“OSHA”) regulation of formaldehyde was remanded by the D.C. Circuit because its notoriously conservative default
estimates and assumptions yielded a much lower risk than epidemiological studies sponsored by the industry itself.106 Agencies should, of course,
substitute actual values for defaults when such data are available and
more plausible than the defaults, but risk assessors should not be required to abandon default values when the proposed “actual” ones are in
the risk assessors’ judgment unproven or against the weight of the evidence.
Numerical estimates of the risk of human cancer fatalities (which is
the model for all of the risk-assessment requirements) are an incomplete
way of viewing environmental problems. Without more, such estimates
describe neither the distribution of risk (is it fairly uniform across the
population or is it focused on a small geographic or demographic
group?), nor the source of the risk (is it a well-operated steel mill or a
midnight dumper?). The distribution of the risk and its source raise the
question of the equity or fairness of the risky activity. Voluntarily assumed risks or risks over which exposed persons exercise some control
are understood differently from those imposed involuntarily on others,
especially those wrongfully imposed. Further, a small risk of a catastrophic result may mathematically be the same as a larger risk of a less dire
outcome, but people are generally more concerned with a catastrophe,
either for themselves in the form of a dreaded disease or for the population generally in a Chernobyl-like disaster.107 Although these qualitative
aspects of risk are not captured in most risk assessments, there is no reason why they cannot be expressed through a more narrative presenta-

(1976). See also Finkel, A Second Opinion, supra note 3, at 339-40 (arguing that a “better
safe than sorry” policy is best). But see Cross, supra note 43.
103. See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Management Will Not Be Improved by
Mandating Numerical Uncertainty Analysis for Risk Assessment, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1599,
1601 (1995) (arguing for disclosure of uncertainty but against required numerical analysis); Arlene Yang, Standards and Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 523
(1995) (arguing that guidelines should focus the uncertainty and policy debate surrounding
risk issues, not attempt to resolve it).
104. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 137.
105. See Finkel, supra note 41, at 441-47.
106. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
107. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 20, at 1072–73, 1078–80.
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tion.108 Therefore, the Guidelines instruct risk assessors to examine different types of risks and their characteristics.
Qualitative elements in risk assessment are not a novelty. Even an
aggressive cost-benefit requirement like President Reagan’s Executive
Order No. 12,291 permitted the use of unquantified elements, and President Clinton’s substitute, No. 12,866, is more generous with qualitative
information. Gilbert Omenn, head of the Presidential/Congressional
Commission on Risk Assessment, has said:
The descriptive and evaluative features are more important than the
quantitative estimate of the magnitude of the risk or probability of
occurrence. Likewise, description of the sources and significance of
the assumptions and uncertainties is at least as important as any
quantitative modeling of those uncertainties.109
Good examples of effects that should be assessed but defy quantification
include ecological risk110 and harms to American Indian culture resulting
from the destruction or contamination of traditionally used places, plants,
and animals.111
Moving toward qualitative risk assessment addresses these concerns. Quantification is not essential to risk assessment, which can effectively present and organize relevant data without specific numerical values. Qualitative risk assessment further avoids the problems of undue
conservatism, it encourages fuller narrative description of risks, and it
avoids reliance on uncertain point estimates. For these reasons, many
comparative risk projects have eschewed quantification,112 and other risk-

108. See Gilbert Omenn, Making Use of Cancer Risk Assessment, 12 Issues in Sci.
& Tech. 29 (1996).
109. Id. at 31. See generally Alfred W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250–1600 (1997) (discussing what is gained and lost through
quantification). Likewise, one year earlier, Gail Charnley, who was executive director of
the Commission, wrote:
Defenders . . . seem to believe that the performance of an “unbiased” risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis will magically make the appropriate regulatory decision apparent. Practicing risk assessors can tell you, however, that
risk assessment is an imprecise tool at best. It is a useful way to organize uncertain scientific information for decisionmaking, but it is not a scientific
method of assessing actual health risks . . . . Risk assessment and cost/benefit
analysis are useful tools, but they do not really provide a “valuable new paradigm for federal environmental regulation . . . .”
Gail Charnley, 11 Issues in Sci. & Tech. 8 (1995) (letter to the editor).
110. See Atcheson, supra note 2, at 1387–89.
111. See Stuart G. Harris & Barbara L. Harper, A Native American Exposure Scenario, 17 Risk Analysis 789 (1997).
112. See Applegate, Comparative Risk Assessment, supra note 35, at 81–82.
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assessment projects have begun to explore qualitative methodologies.113
The Guidelines urge the use of unquantified risk assessments where uncertainty or the qualitative aspects of risk predominate.
5. Risk comparisons can be helpful for placing risks in context for
standard setting or priority setting, but the comparisons should be approached with great caution and comparison of unlike risks should be
avoided.
No one—scientists, risk assessors, or regulators—can visualize
what a one-in-a-million lifetime risk of cancer means. On the one hand, it
seems quite unlikely for any given individual. On the other hand, the
costs of being that one person in a million seem quite high. One of the
major challenges of communicating information about risk is putting risk
into a meaningful context for lay audiences, for scientists, and for policymakers.114 One way to accomplish this goal is to compare the risk under consideration with other, more familiar risks, as one might express
the length of the Titanic in terms of football fields. This comparison not
only helps in understanding just how big the ship was, but it also helps in
evaluating the length for a specific purpose, such as determining whether
it is possible to build a full-size replica for a movie set. The same technique has been used with risk assessment, for similar purposes. Knowing
how the risk of death from a chemical exposure compares in magnitude
to being hit by lightning helps, in theory, to understand the risk and to
evaluate potential responses.115 Hence, some risk-assessment bills mandate comparisons with “familiar” risks.
The obvious difficulty with this technique is what might be called
the “apples and oranges” problem. The Titanic and football fields are
comparable in length, but in little else. Likewise, apples and oranges may
be compared, as long as the criteria for comparison are clearly understood and are material to the decision to be made. With risk, the problem
is that death—the usual common metric—does not constitute an allinclusive basis for comparison among environmental problems.116 As discussed above, many kinds of risks affect groups of people and the environment in varied ways. In addition, the risk of death from cancer is an
important endpoint, but cancer is not the only disease of concern to regu113. See Consortium for Environmental Risk Evaluation (CERE), Interim Risk Report, Health and Ecological Risks at the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Weapons
Complex: A Qualitative Evaluation (1995).
114. See generally Understanding Risk, supra note 7; Presidential/Congres- sional
Comm’n, supra note 8; National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication, supra
note 7 (all describing the role of risk assessment in public deliberation on risk issues).
115. For an example of this approach, see the “risk ladder” presented in Justice
Breyer’s widely read book on risk regulation. Breyer, supra note 46, at 3–5.
116. See Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 Risk: Health, Safety &
Env’t. 325, 330–35 (1996).
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lators. Other health risks which science does not fully understand, such
as endocrine disrupters and genetic mutagens, require attention.
Further, many risks covered by federal regulations do not involve
death from chronic illness. Serious and debilitating occupational or recreational injuries and harms to the environment cannot readily be measured against a single yardstick. Avoidable risks, too, might be viewed
quite differently from unavoidable ones,117 just as voluntarily assumed
risks are different from those imposed by others. In sum, a “familiar”118
risk is not the same as a similar risk, and comparison of dissimilar risks
is only marginally useful and highly subject to manipulation.
Another difficulty with risk comparison arises from the same uncertainty and variability that plagues other uses of risk assessment. In the
first place, the comparative data ought to be of the same or similar quality to the risk being assessed. In two recent reexaminations of risk- and
cost-ranking lists that have been widely used to support the claim that
regulation is irrationally strict, careful study of the underlying data has
shown that most of the values used in the comparison lists range from
questionable to baseless.119 Comparisons based on anecdotes and unsubstantiated analyses are not acceptable. The caveats that apply to point
estimates of the principal risks also apply to comparators. Once uncertainty and ranges are accounted for, it may be that many comparisons
will overlap, limiting the utility of the comparative exercise.
The fundamental problem with risk comparisons as a part of the
analysis of regulatory action is the implicit assumption that higher risks
will be addressed. If, for example, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) only has jurisdiction over foods and drugs, opportunities for
greater risk reduction in highway design are irrelevant to FDA’s judgments about the risks of a particular pharmaceutical product.120 Or to say
117. Kip Viscusi gives the example of the greater risk of death from the earth being
hit by a “doomsday” asteroid than an American worker being killed on the job (1/6,000 vs.
1/10,000). See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for
Risk 5 (1992). These numbers seem suspect in themselves, perhaps because of the respective time frames. Even so, the asteroid risk does not render the occupational risk negligible, because little can be done to prevent the former, and much can be done to prevent the
latter.
118. Familiarity also tends to encourage comfort or complacency about risks, in
which case comparison with a familiar risk would encourage the following syllogism: I’m
not unduly concerned about dying in an automobile accident; an automobile accident is
much more likely than death from dioxin emissions; therefore I shouldn’t be concerned
about dioxin emissions. The Guidelines deplore this kind of manipulative use of risk assessment. The classic work on risk perception is Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Science 280 (1987); see also Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello, The Social and
Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and Perception (1987).
119. See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J.
1981 (1998); Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation: Are
Justice, Efficiency, and Democracy Reconcilable?, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 706, 727–30 (1998)
(book review essay).
120. See Wirth & Silbergeld, Risky Reform, supra note 28, at 1878, 1884; Hearings
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that driving at 65 m.p.h. is more dangerous than limited dioxin emissions, and that we therefore should decline to regulate the dioxin, is to
hold out the false promise that something will be done about the speed
limit.121 If the speed limit will not be lowered, then there is no good reason based on risk alone to accept the cumulative risk posed by the dioxin.
Required risk comparison only makes sense if Congress will legislate
and spend on the high-risk activities—like smoking—and not use it as an
excuse to ignore the others.
6. Risk assessment should be conducted through an open process
that allows input from and understanding of the results by the entire
range of persons and groups interested in the decision. Particular efforts
should be made to reach persons and groups who do not have the technical expertise to use such materials easily.
Risk assessment should improve regulatory decisions made in the
broader context of a democratic society. Risk assessment can either obfuscate the decisions by lending them a patina of scientific precision and
inevitability, or it can inform a robust “social dialogue on safety.”122 The
recent studies by the NAS and the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk strongly advocate the latter, envisioning an ongoing, informed dialogue on risk and values among scientists, policymakers, industry, and average citizens.123
Members of the public can contribute ideas, concerns, and information that will make risk assessments richer and more realistic. For examon S. 981 “Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997,” Before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong. 18 (1997) (Statement of David G. Hawkins, Senior
Attorney, Natural Resources Defense Council). Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 267, 298 (1993) (“In considering opportunity costs, society should
consider only other opportunities that it might actually implement; in short, it should
choose among the most desirable of the feasible alternatives.”).
121. To give another example, a NAS panel investigating radiation shielding for astronauts assumed that such shielding would be of little interest to the astronauts, because
the radiation risk of cancer was far less than the risk of lift-off. The astronauts, however,
were quite concerned about radiation, believing that the flight risks were integral to the
operation and limited in time, while the radiation risk was avoidable and continued long
after the flight. National Research Council, Radiation Hazards to Crews of Interplanetary
Missions: Biological Issues and Research Strategies (1996).
122. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law, supra note 2, at 633 (noting significant skepticism about the ability of most quantitative forms of risk assessment to inform such a dialogue.) In a similar vein, Professor Wagner has criticized the use of apparently scientific methods to obscure political questions with a false sense of scientific certainty. See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. 1613 (1995).
123. See Understanding Risk, supra note 7; Presidential/Congressional Comm’n,
supra note 8. The role of deliberative democracy in environmental decisionmaking is discussed, and the importance of an informed public emphasized, in John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizens Advisory Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 Ind. L.J. 903 (1998).
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ple, the effects of a health hazard on certain subpopulations, or the distribution of risk throughout the population, may be far more apparent to lay
citizens directly affected by the hazard than to risk assessors. Citizens
may have a degree of familiarity with an area or an activity that regulators lack and that the regulated community may hesitate to address. More
generally, the wisdom of obtaining a “second opinion” from non-experts
is at the heart of citizen (and judicial) review of agency action and acts as
a hedge against the tunnel vision which can easily limit an expert
agency’s perspective.124 Similarly, public scrutiny can be a check on the
unconscious biases that may enter a process that relies on professional
judgment.125
Public participation strengthens even controversial decisions by obtaining broader public understanding and acceptance.126 Risk assessment
contributes to this goal when it is transparent and supports good risk
communication.127 Here again, all assumptions, models, and extrapolations should be fully explained and justified. Professional risk assessment should be solicited and used—it should inform the decision—but it
should not make decisions in a vacuum.
7. Risk assessment is a tool to improve regulatory decisionmaking,
not a tactic to delay or impede it. To avoid “paralysis by analysis,” risk
assessments should be required only when the decision is of sufficient
significance to warrant the effort, and the amount of effort that goes into
the risk assessment must be reasonable in relation to the significance of
the decision and the value of additional information.
The effort of collecting and analyzing relevant data should bear
some relation to the decision’s significance in terms of environmental or
economic impact, difficulty, or other measure of importance. NEPA recognizes this practicality with its threshold requirement of a “major federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”128 and the regulatory planning executive orders have established a
monetary threshold.129 An economic threshold is an imperfect but man-

124. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850–53 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
125. See Kuehn, supra note 2, at 135–36, 160–66.
126. See generally National Research Council, Building Consensus Through Risk Assessment and Management of the Department of Energy’s Environmental Remediation
Program 31–41 (1994) (recommending that agency decisions should be publicly accessible) [hereinafter Building Consensus].
127. See id. at 24–30; Goldstein, supra note 83, at 37 (arguing that generic risk assessment guidelines, combining both science and policy, should be established).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994).
129. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (defining
“significant regulatory action”); Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8, at 154–
55.
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ageable surrogate for the importance of a decision and for the utility of
risk assessment in reaching it.
Once the decision to prepare a risk assessment has been made, the
scope of the analysis should reflect the substance of the decision and the
alternatives before the agency. The amount of data and analysis required
should also bear some relation to the significance of the decision. The
NAS has warned, in its study of risk assessment mandated by the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990:
Risk assessment should be adjunct to the Clean Air Act’s primary
goal of safeguarding public health, not an end in itself. A legitimate
desire for accuracy and objectivity in representing risk can induce
such an obsession with numbers that too much energy is expended
on representing the results of risk assessment in precise numerical
form. Thus, new research might be commissioned because there is
insufficient notice of how marginal the results would be in a given
case or without consideration of new, less resource-intensive methods of providing essential inputs.
Moreover, there might be a vast difference between having “the
truth” and having enough information to enable a risk manager to
choose the best course of action from the options available.130
This requirement is no more than a question of cost-effectiveness: after a
certain point, the cost of additional effort exceeds its value to the decisionmaker.131 More research could always be done, but procedural requirements designed to improve the regulatory process should not in effect demand more analysis and less action.132
Making the regulatory process more time-consuming and expensive
will not solve the problem of wastefully strict regulation (if there is one).
Moreover, elaborate and resource-intensive analytical requirements disproportionately burden those who do not have ready access to the necessary expertise and resources. As Robert Kuehn succinctly puts it, “with
the tool comes power.”133
For similar reasons, external involvement in agencies’ selection of
issues to address should be limited, though not eliminated. The petition
process in some of the 104th Congress’s bills would have allowed out-

130. Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment, supra note 7, at 260.
131. See Toxicity Testing, supra note 31, at 207; Presidential/Congressional
Comm’n, supra note 8, at 154–55; Building Consensus, supra note 126, at 32-33; Thomas
O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729, 736–
40 (1979).
132. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End, supra note 19, at 1648–51.
133. Kuehn, supra note 2, at 129 (capitalization altered).
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side parties to petition to revise already completed risk assessments, to
obtain judicial review of denial of such petitions, and to insist on an
agency response within a relatively short period of time. Studies of
OSHA and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) have
documented how agencies subject to a mandatory petition process have
lost focus and effectiveness.134 The right to petition agencies for action or
reconsideration is included in the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”),135 but the ability to demand that an agency effectively drop everything and revisit a risk assessment that supported a particular rule invites abuse. Again, risk-assessment requirements should not worsen the
regulatory processes they seek to improve.
Another potential manifestation of paralyzing detail would be a requirement for separate risk assessments—and subsidiary peer review and
judicial review—for subunits of a regulatory action. For example, OSHA
often regulates substances, equipment, or activities that occur in several
industries, where there may be differences in exposure patterns or other
relevant data. Sometimes separate analyses may be needed, but the agency
should have the freedom to determine when aggregation is proper. Judicial decisions have in the past required OSHA to disaggregate its analyses,136 placing a nearly insurmountable administrative burden upon the
agency. Moreover, the subdivision of already scarce data into smaller
units would either frustrate the ability to regulate some subunits or render
the resulting analyses suspect as being based on too little data. The appropriate unit for legislative consideration is the agency decision itself.
Where the agency regulates too broadly, the experience with NEPA has
shown that the judiciary will intervene.137
8. To permit effective but appropriately deferential judicial oversight, risk assessment issues, like other forms of regulatory analysis,
should be reviewed after final agency action, on the whole record of that
action.
134. See Richard A. Merrill, CPSC Regulation of Cancer Risks in Consumer Products: 1972-1981, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1261, 1363–64 (1981); Shapiro & McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA, supra note 31, at 15–18; Thomas R. Bartman, Note, Deciding What to Regulate:
Priority-Setting at OSHA, 2 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 87, 108–10 (1982).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1994).
136. See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 630–
38 (1980) (plurality opinion) (disaggregating consideration of the risks posed by 100, 10,
and 1 parts per million of benzene); AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 982 n.28 (11th Cir.
1992) (deferring question of requiring individualized risk determinations on an industryby-industry basis). But see Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement
Workers of Am., UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (accepting OSHA’s explanation on remand for its decision to adopt a single standard applicable to all general industry workers, rather than to disaggregate industries).
137. CEQ requires agencies to consider together actions that have “relevant similarities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media,
or subject matter.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (1997). The decision on whether to prepare a
programmatic impact statement lies with the agency. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390 (1976); see also Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Judicial review is another form of external interference, albeit a
necessary one. Judicial review of the risk assessment per se would presumably involve a searching inquiry by the court into the process and
reasoning of the agency’s risk assessors. Putting aside the limited competence of generalist judges to undertake a technical critique, the practical
effect would be judicial overkill. As seen elsewhere in environmental
regulation, judicial review has frequently been accused of exaggerating
the tendency in any bureaucracy to make what is properly an analytical
tool into an expensive and time-consuming end in itself.138 Agencies are
already subject to reversal based on judicial dissatisfaction with the quality of the risk analysis, as occurred in Gulf South Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission,139 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 140
and Leather Industries of America, Inc. v. EPA.141 Most recently, in FlueCured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, the district court
“vacated” several chapters of an EPA report on the risks of passive smoking.142 To add to this burden by making risk assessment per se subject to
judicial review would strain the technical capabilities of judges and give
risk assessment an unwarranted prominence among the many elements of
an agency decision. It would also encourage the production of “unassailable” risk assessments that would expend agency resources out of proportion to the value of the additional information.
Review should therefore take place, as it normally does, in the context of a final agency action, at the end of the regulatory process. At that
point, the risk analysis can be seen in its proper context, and the court
can properly evaluate the real question before it: whether the agency,
using the risk assessment, took a hard look at the risk issues before it.
The adequacy of the agency’s decisionmaking process would be fully
available for review, including the adequacy of the risk analysis, but a
parallel track of regulatory challenges is avoided.143

IV. A Proposed Risk-assessment Model and Procedure
Fashioning federal risk-assessment legislation poses a difficult challenge for Congress because such legislation responds to several different
138. This process often goes by the name “ossification.” See Thomas O. McGarity,
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1385–86
(1992).
139. 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
140. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
141. 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
142. 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998). The court’s decision applied to a report
and not a regulation; in other words, it involved direct review of a risk assessment.
143. See infra Part IV.D for a more specific discussion of the scope and standard of
judicial review.
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and potentially conflicting goals. The first goal is to incorporate scientific analysis into the regulatory decisionmaking process, but only as one
tool among several which the decisionmaker should consider. Second,
Congress should structure an agency mandate to consider risk, without
affecting the underlying substantive provisions in each statute. A third
goal is to formulate risk-assessment procedures without stifling developments in the field of risk assessment. Fourth, despite the insistence on
scientific analysis, the process should handle uncertainty and gaps in risk
assessment that can only be filled through the use of policy judgments.
Fifth, Congress should incorporate public participation in this technically
complex, yet value-driven, area. Sixth, to avoid paralysis, the legislation
must place appropriate boundaries on the timing and depth of risk assessments, and it must determine an appropriate scope and standard of
judicial review. While the setting for these conflicting goals is new, Congress faced the same challenges in crafting NEPA.144 Consequently,
NEPA and its common law can serve as instructive models for federal
risk legislation.
President Nixon signed NEPA into law on January 1, 1970. Just as
Congress now wishes to ensure that agencies factor risk into their decisionmaking, Congress enacted section 102(2)(C) of NEPA to ensure that
agencies consider the environmental impacts of their decisions.145 Section
102, the primary action-forcing provision of NEPA, states:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this Chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal
Government shall . . . . (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental
impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.146
These requirements led to the creation of the EIA process .

144. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370d (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-99 (1997).
145. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
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The use of NEPA and the EIA process as a model would facilitate
the harmonization of risk and environmental impact analyses in cases
where both are required, as occurs with NEPA and the Endangered Species Act.147 Therefore, this Part outlines the key elements of a potential
Risk Impact Assessment (“RIA”) procedure based on the NEPA experience.

A. Avoiding “Paralysis by Analysis”
One of the concerns with risk assessment is identified in proposed
Principle Seven:148 that risk assessment will be a tool which will impede
or delay agency decisionmaking by requiring unreasonable allocations of
resources to minor issues. The EIA process crudely addresses this concern by identifying three classes of agency activities:
those that may have a significant impact on the quality of the human environment [thus] requiring a environmental impact statement (“EIS”);
those which virtually never have a significant impact and are thereby
categorically excluded from the EIS requirement; and,
those where the agency does not know whether the environmental
impact will be significant enough to require an EIS and therefore
require an environmental assessment (“EA”) to determine whether
an EIS is required.149
Because this division may be useful in considering a future RIA procedure, it is briefly summarized below.
In the EIA process, “actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and for
which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required” are categorically excluded.150 Likewise in a RIA process, actions that do not individually or cumulatively
have a significant effect on human health or the environment should be
excluded from risk-assessment requirements.

147. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(9) (1997) (defining “significantly” under NEPA for
agency actions affecting the environment and stating that the intensity of the action should
include the degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened
species or its habitat that has been designated as critical under the Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (1994)). See also Contra Costa, 1998 WL 164966, at *1.
148. See infra Appendix I.
149. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11, 1508.4, & 1508.9 (1997).
150. Id. § 1508.4 (1997).
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In the EIA process, when it is unclear whether an action may have a
significant impact on the quality of the human environment, the agency
prepares an EA. An EA (1) analyzes and provides evidence on whether to
prepare an EIS, and may ultimately result in a (2) Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”), in which the agency must justify its decision not
to prepare an EIS.151 The EA contains a brief discussion of the need for
the project, reasonable alternatives to the proposal, environmental impacts of the proposal and alternatives, and a listing of interested parties.
The public must be involved in the preparation of an EA.
Likewise, the RIA process should incorporate a tiered approach to
deciding when a full risk assessment is required. There may be areas that
should be categorically excluded from risk-assessment requirements and
situations when the agency should do a preliminary investigation to determine whether a full risk assessment is warranted. The NEPA system,
which decides when to devote the full panoply of federal resources to the
evaluation of risks and when to investigate but determine that further
inquiry is not justifiable, provides a workable model and body of case
law to adopt by analogy.
Where a tiered system is used, the threshold question of when an
EIS or risk assessment must be prepared is crucial. In the NEPA context,
an EIS must be prepared when there is a “major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”152 This standard
provides in-depth consideration of environmental impacts where they are
“significant,” a term defined on a case-by-case basis depending on the
context and intensity of the proposal.153 The term “major” reinforces
“significant” and does not have independent meaning.154 In the search for
criteria for determining when risk assessment is or is not required, NEPA
would guide us to require risk assessment for rules that “may have a significant impact on human health or the environment.” The twenty-eight
years of case law interpreting this provision provides an instant repository of agency and judicial insight on how to achieve the proper balance
between requiring agencies to provide information and not overly encumbering the agency process.

B. The Public Participation Paradox
Principle Six is designed to promote public participation in decisionmaking.155 The difficulty at the heart of drafting public participation
guidelines for risk assessment is the aura of scientific complexity that
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id. § 1508.13 (1997).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (1997).
40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1997).
See Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321–22 (8th Cir. 1974).
See infra Appendix I.
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surrounds the process. Yet, as shown above, value judgments infuse the
process, affecting the risks of both present and future generations. Again,
we can look to NEPA for guidance, for just as the process of risk assessment is both scientifically complex and value-laden, so is the process of
determining the environmental impacts of a proposed federal action.
Over time, the common law of NEPA has created an operative system of
experts both within and outside the agency as well as non-expert, interested parties who negotiate workable solutions though a generous public
participation system.156
The first stage of the NEPA process is the publication of a notice of
intent to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register, including information on
planned meetings and the names and addresses of the agency contact
people.157 Next, interested parties are invited to join in a scoping process
designed to identify significant issues. During scoping, the agency identifies all applicable environmental requirements, deadlines and page limits,
the allocation of responsibilities among agencies, and the structure of and
process for the EIS. The lead agency then prepares a draft EIS. The draft
EIS is distributed for public and agency comment for a minimum period
of 45 days.158 After this comment period, the lead agency must consider
and evaluate the comments.159 This review is particularly significant because public participation requirements in other statutes do not always
require the agency to consider or respond to public input. Under NEPA,
however, all substantive comments received by the agency are included
in the final EIS with the agency’s response.160 Last, the agency prepares
the final EIS, sends it to anyone who submitted comments, and publishes
a notice of availability in the Federal Register. The agency then waits for
30 days from the notice of availability of the final EIS or 90 days after
publication of the notice of availability of the draft EIS, whichever is
later, before making its final decision on the proposal.161
The public participation requirements of the EIA process are notable
for their extensive scoping process, which allows public participation in
defining the issues, and in their requirement that the agency respond to
comments. The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk adopted
this process because of its usefulness in the risk context.162
Although the issues in many EISs are highly complex and technical,
the EIA process has established an iterative feedback loop that includes
156. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 965 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) and stating that the development of a “common law of NEPA” has been the source of
the statute’s success).
157. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.22 (1997).
158. See id. § 1506.10(c).
159. See id. § 1503.4.
160. See id. § 1503.4(b).
161. See id. § 1506.10.
162. See Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8, at 7–28.
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potentially interested parties from the commencement of the project. As a
result, a cadre of experts, both within and outside the agency and lay interested parties coalesce around the project from the pre-planning stage.
In addition, agencies must explain their processes and assumptions to lay
audiences who express their particular normative concerns to the agency
while these comments can still influence agency choices. Requiring
agencies to respond to comments ensures that these normative concerns
are at least considered.
In the risk context, public participation at the “scoping” phase of the
RIA, the requirement that agencies explain data and assumptions to nontechnical audiences, and the requirement that agencies consider the normative concerns of the affected parties would be valuable lessons to be
learned from NEPA.

C. One Tool Among Many to Make Informed Decisions
The case law interpreting NEPA has concluded that the EIS essentially serves the same function as the Guidelines envision for risk assessment in Principles One and Two.163
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that NEPA is a procedural
statute designed to ensure that both decisionmakers and the public are
fully informed of the environmental consequences of agency action and
that NEPA does not dictate a substantive outcome. In 1978, the Supreme
Court held that NEPA:
is to ensure a fully informed and well-considered decision, not necessarily a decision the judges of the Court of Appeals or this Court
would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking
unit of the agency.164
That decision remains strong today.165 The Court has stated that NEPA
also “ensures that the agency will inform the public that it has indeed
considered environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.”166
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have gone on to hold that the
scope of NEPA is limited.
163. See infra Appendix I. See generally Township of Lower Alloways Creek v.
Pub. Service Elec. & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 739 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Vt. Yankee, 435
U.S. at 558 and Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979), and stating that NEPA
imposes essentially procedural duties upon agencies having the potential to affect the environment and ensures that environmental concerns are integrated into the process of agency
decisionmaking).
164. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.
165. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 100–01 (1983) (quoting
Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553).
166. Id. at 97.
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Congress . . . however, did not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations . . . . Rather,
it required only that the agency take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences before taking a major action . . . .
Congress did not enact NEPA, of course, so that an agency would
contemplate the environmental impact of an action as an abstract
exercise. Rather, Congress intended that the “hard look” be incorporated as part of the agency’s process of deciding whether to pursue a particular federal action.167
Likewise, the RIA process is designed to ensure that the agency
makes an informed decision and notifies the public of its rationale. Just
as the EIS is not the sole factor for the agency’s consideration while
making its decision, an agency must consider many factors in making
public health regulatory decisions. Just as with NEPA, the RIA should
not mandate a specific result. As the Supreme Court concluded in 1989,
NEPA “itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes
the necessary process. If the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.”168

D. Judicial Review
Principle Eight provides a guideline with two key elements.169 First,
there should be effective but appropriately deferential judicial review of
the RIA. Second, such review should take place after the final agency
decision and be included in the administrative record.
The RIA process should mirror the EIA process in the scope and
standard of judicial review. The Supreme Court declared that “once an
agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements,
the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered the
environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of
discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’”170
The rationale is usually that the Court does not have the authority or expertise to substitute its judgement for that of the agency.171
167. Id. at 97, 100.
168. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1989)
(citations omitted).
169. See infra Appendix I.
170. Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28
(1980) (quoting Kleppe 427 U.S. at 410, n.21).
171. See Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.
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The standard of judicial review under NEPA, as it should be in the
RIA, is the “arbitrary, capricious” standard under the APA. 172 As the Supreme Court stated:
The role of the courts is simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its
actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious…. Our
only task is to determine whether the Commission has considered
the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.173
Likewise the role of the court in reviewing the RIA process should be to
ensure that the agency is not acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner
and to ensure a rational connection between the risk assessment and the
conclusions.
This deference, however, does not mean that the court has no role to
play in the process. The court must ensure that the risk assessment is not
a post hoc rationalization for the agency’s predetermined conclusion. To
do so, the court must demand an adequate administrative record174—a
requirement that, importantly, is entirely consistent with broad public
participation throughout the RIA process. In addition, judges can review
the agencies’ decision whether to perform a risk assessment. 175 Finally,
courts can review whether the agency has made a reasoned or rational
decision in light of the risk assessment and other relevant factors.176
With respect to timing, the general rule is that, in accordance with
the administrative law doctrines of ripeness and finality, an EIS will not
be subject to judicial review in advance of the final, substantive agency
decision. In drafting NEPA, Congress did not create a private cause of
action. Therefore plaintiffs must bring an action under Section 702 of the
APA.177 Section 704 of the APA allows review only of final agency action.178 In determining whether an agency action is final “[t]he core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and
whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the par-

172. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
173. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 97–98, 105.
174. In the NEPA context, see id.; see also Marion D. Miller, The National Environmental Policy Act and Judicial Review After Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 18 Ecology L.Q. 223, 251
(1991).
175. In the NEPA context, see Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th
Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1988);
LaFlamme v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988).
176. In the NEPA context, see Marsh v. Oregon NRC, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
178. Id. § 704. See Lujan v. Nat. Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990).
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ties.”179 In virtually every challenge to an EIS, the final agency action is
the Record of Decision. Likewise, in the RIA process, the final agency
action would be the final rule. The timing of judicial review is analogous
in both cases.
The same general approach should apply to the RIA process. If anything, the requirements of ripeness and finality apply with greater force
in the RIA context. In NEPA cases, the EIS often introduces concerns
(i.e., environmental effects) that are external to the relevant agency’s
mandate. As a result, it is particularly important for the courts to police
the agency’s consideration of environmental factors to ensure that the
EIS is part of the decisionmaking process and not a post hoc rationalization. In contrast, risk assessment is closely related to the central concerns
of the agencies responsible for environmental, health, and safety regulation, so early intervention in these agencies’ deliberations is unnecessary.180 In addition, an exception for early review of risk assessments
would swallow the finality rule in environmental, health, and safety regulation, since it could be invoked in virtually every situation. Finally, the
content of risk assessments, like environmental impact assessments, is
context-dependent.181 Therefore, abstractly reviewing adequacy places
courts in the position of defining the issues for the agency (an inappropriate exercise of judicial oversight) and forces the agency to cover every
conceivable—rather than reasonable—aspect of a given situation.

E. Uncertainty
Principle Four addresses the issue of scientific uncertainty in undertaking a risk assessment.182 While the problem of lack of scientific information seems particularly poignant in the RIA process, it also plagues
environmental assessment. Again, NEPA regulations and common law
provide insight on how to deal with scientific uncertainty.183
The Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations recognize that the problem of uncertainty is an inevitable and recurring issue
in predicting environmental effects. The NEPA regulations therefore deal

179. Franklin v. Mass., 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992); see also Pub. Citizen v. United
States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041
(1994).
180. For the same reason, EPA’s compliance with NEPA is usually excused because
the analyses under its authorizing statutes are the “functional equivalent” of NEPA. See
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law 905–07 (2d ed. 1994).
181. See Presidential/Congressional Comm’n, supra note 8, at 7–22.
182. See infra Appendix I.
183. See generally Marcia R. Gelpe and A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. Cal. L. Rev. 371 (1974) (exploring “the
response of the legal system to the uncertainty which is inherent in the scientific analysis
of environmental impact”).
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with the issue explicitly.184 If there is a feasible means to obtain information about an environmental impact, the agency must do so unless the
costs are exorbitant. However, if the agency finds a reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impact for which the information is incomplete
or unavailable, then the agency must state in the EIS what information is
incomplete or unavailable, explain the relevance of the information,
summarize the relevant credible scientific evidence, and evaluate the impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally
accepted in the scientific community.185
There is also language in the NEPA case law that can illuminate the
current debate on how to handle uncertainty in the RIA. For example, the
D.C. Circuit Court has addressed this issue:
One of the costs that must be weighed by decisionmakers is the cost
of uncertainty-i.e. the costs of proceeding without more and better
information. When that cost has been considered, and where the responsible decisionmaker has decided that it is outweighed by the
benefits of proceeding without further delay, the courts may not
substitute their judgement for that of the decisionmaker and insist
that the project be delayed while more information is sought.186
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the D.C. Circuit:
Neither § 102(2)(B) or (C) can be read as a requirement that complete information concerning the environmental impact of a project
be obtained before action may be taken. If we were to impose a requirement that an impact statement can never be prepared until all
relevant environmental effects were known, it is doubtful that any
project could ever be initiated . . . . At any point in time, there are
likely to be any number of studies underway concerning a host of
environmental or other societal problems. What appellants seek is
for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary,
who is charged by NEPA with preparing a thorough statement of
the environmental consequences of a proposed project, as to what
particular information will be required to complete that statement.
We decline to assume that role.187
In the NEPA context, the courts are deferential to the agency’s decision on how to balance the need for the proposed action with proceeding
184. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a)–(b)(1) (1997).
185. See id.
186. Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473–74 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part by
Western Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978) (internal citations omitted).
187. Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280–81 (9th Cir.
1973) (internal citations omitted).
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in the face of scientific uncertainty. Some degree of uncertainty will be
an issue in virtually every scientific risk assessment in the foreseeable
future. The NEPA case law can help guide the RIA progress.

V. Conclusion
There is a great deal of scholarly debate over whether NEPA has
been successful in achieving its objectives as set out in its preamble.188
However, there is little argument that NEPA has changed the agency decisionmaking process, increased public participation in the decisionmaking process, and increased accountability of the decisionmakers. These
are precisely the objectives of the RIA. Because of its success as an informational statute, NEPA provides a useful model for our present riskassessment debates.
The experience with NEPA validates the pragmatic approach advocated in this Article. Principally, NEPA counsels that responsible legislative requirements must be flexible enough to account for the wide variety
of federal regulation, for the varying levels of availability and reliability
of underlying data, and for developments in methodology. Risk assessments should be carefully framed to assure that their expense and delay
do not overwhelm the value they add to the regulatory process, and they
must maintain an appropriate relationship between regulated entities, the
public, courts, and agencies. These Guidelines strive to achieve that balance in risk assessment legislation.

188. See Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A
Preface, 20 Envtl. L. 447 (1990); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in Environmental Law, 20 Envtl. L. 485 (1990); Donald N. Zillman
& Peggy Gentles, Perspectives on NEPA in the Courts, 20 Envtl. L. 505 (1990); Nicholas
C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise—Partially Fulfilled, 20 Envtl. L. 533 (1990); David C. Shilton, Is
the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations for a 12-0 Record, 20
Envtl. L. 551 (1990); Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 Envtl. L. 569 (1990).
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Appendix I: The Draft Guidelines
Any formal requirement that Federal Government agencies undertake formal risk assessments in advance of regulatory action should conform to the following principles:
1. Risk assessment considers an important and useful but not comprehensive set of information relevant to regulatory decisions.
2. The purpose of risk assessment is to gather, analyze, organize,
and present relevant information; it should not itself be an argument for
or dictate a particular substantive outcome.
3. Risk-assessment requirements must allow for flexibility to account for a variety of applications of the tool—safety as well as health,
acute risks as well as chronic ones—and for developments in methodology and scientific knowledge. Risk assessors should exercise their professional judgments but be subject to the requirements of identifying and
explaining their judgments. Peer review should be limited to discrete issues upon which there is considerable disagreement, uncertainty, or other
difficulty.
4. Risk assessments must explicitly acknowledge and explain the
limitations of the process in terms of methodology, data, assumptions,
uncertainty, variability, and qualitative characteristics of risk. Thus,
agencies should use qualitative risk assessments when uncertainty or the
qualitative aspects of risk predominate. Direct evidence of risks should
be used when it is available and reliable; otherwise, it is appropriate to
use standardized, protective “default” assumptions.
5. Risk comparisons can be helpful for placing risks in context for
standard setting or priority setting, but the comparisons should be approached with great caution and comparison of unlike risks should be
avoided.
6. Risk assessment should be conducted through an open process
that allows input from and understanding of the results by the entire
range of persons and groups interested in the decision. Particular efforts
should be made to reach persons and groups who do not have the technical expertise to use such materials easily.
7. Risk assessment is a tool to improve regulatory decisionmaking,
not a tactic to delay or impede it. To avoid “paralysis by analysis,” risk
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assessments should be required only when the decision is of sufficient
significance to warrant the effort, and the amount of effort that goes into
the risk assessment must be reasonable in relation to the significance of
the decision and the value of additional information.
8. To permit effective but appropriately deferential judicial oversight, risk assessment issues, like other forms of regulatory analysis,
should be reviewed after final agency action, on the whole record of that
action.

Appendix II: Comparison of Risk Reform Proposals
The following chart is a summary of several risk reform bills, each
of which differs in important details from the others. While this chart is a
helpful way to convey broad differences in approach, it inevitably misses
subtleties in specific bills. Readers who wish to evaluate particular pieces
of legislation, therefore, should not rely solely on the characterization
here but should consult the original.
“Aggressive Risk Reform” includes the legislation cited above in
the 104th Congress, including the Contract with America bills and H.R.
1834189 (affecting OSHA).190 “Congressional Compromise” reflects primarily the Levin-Thompson bill in the 105th Congress, to a lesser extent
the revision of the Safe Drinking Water Act, but not Senator Thompson’s
S. 2161. The last column, Entitled “Risk Principles,” reflects this Article’s Draft Guidelines.

189. H.R. 1834, 104th Cong., (1995) (June 14, 1995 version). Much of the bill was
drafted by lobbyists for subject industries. David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, Tell
Newt to Shut Up! 61 (1996).
190. For a detailed critique of this legislation, see McGarity & Shapiro, OSHA’s
Critics and Regulatory Reform, supra note 4.
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Risk Reform
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Compromise
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Risk
Principles

Substantive Provisions
“Supermandate”: requires all safety,
health, and environmental rules to be
cost-justified (i.e., that calculated
benefits outweigh calculated costs)
Judicial review of risk assessment

X

per se

X

part of record

none

Risk Assessment Procedures
Requires quantification of risks and
X
benefits, or devalues unquantified risks
Requires explanation of assumptions
X
and uncertainties
Requires analysis of risk distribution
in population192
Analysis of “substitution risk” (i.e.,
X
the risks of the intervention itself)193
Requires risk analyses of alternative
X
regulatory actions
Prescribes Red Book formulation for
X
conducting risk assessments
Requires assessment of non-human
environmental risk
Data collection and analysis tied to
the importance of decision and the
need for information
Requires agency seriously consider
X196
data proffered by interest groups
Broad public participation in risk
assessment process
Peer review
X
Petition process and look-back at
X
existing rules
Risk Expression and Communication
Response to “significant” comments
X
required
Comparisons with “familiar” risks
X
required
Risks to be expressed as ranges;
X
upper-bound (worst-case) risks not
permitted standing alone
Requires “best estimates,” “realistic
X
assumptions,” “central” estimates
Regulatory Analysis and Oversight
“Major rule” threshold for require- Low (varies)
ment
Requires risk-based priority setting
X
Intensive OMB oversight and coordination of risk assessment process
Control of ex parte communications
with OMB

?
X191

X

X

X

X
X194

X

X
?195

X

X197

X

X
X198

X

X
X199

X

X

high ($100 million)

(X)200
X 202
X203

high ($100
million)

X201
X
X
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191. This requirement clearly applies to assumptions and uncertainties specific to a
particular decision, but it is less clear whether generic assumptions that serve as starting
points (for example, the validity of extrapolating the results of animal testing to humans)
would need to be justified in detail for every decision.
192. Risk distribution analyses within populations are important from an environmental justice point of view. However, such analyses also require large amounts of data
that frequently do not exist or would be expensive to assemble.
193. The idea of substitution risks is detailed in Graham & Wiener, supra note 35 at
22–25. In all of the bills, it is not clear whether substitution risks must be analyzed in the
same detail as the principal risk being addressed.
194. See id.
195. S. 981, 105th Cong. (1995), is unclear on this element. On the one hand, it says
that the level of analysis should correspond to the seriousness of the risk and speaks of
“reasonably available” information; on the other hand, it requires a “succinct” executive
summary, § 623(e), which implies a sizable back-up document.
196. Older bills basically required the agency to take industry- or interest group–
generated data into account. S. 981, 105th Cong. § 624(b) (1995) (“reliable and reasonably
available scientific information”).
197. Public participation requirements are limited to state, local, and tribal governments; there is no mention of stakeholders generally.
198. S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997), allows the agency to accommodate such processes
on its own schedule. Previous bills required agencies to respond to petitions to reexamine
risk assessments within a short period of time. See S. 333, 104th Cong. § 5(b)(3) (1995);
H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3401(a) (1995); see also H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 3401(b) (1995)
(providing for judicial review of denials of petitions).
199. A “familiar” risk is not necessarily a similar one.
200. The 105th Congress required a study to assess this option.
201. Risk is one consideration; others are also permitted. Cf. Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) at §1(b)(4) (providing for judicial review of denials of
petitions).
202. This element confirms the coordinating role of OMB as framed by the executive orders of the last two decades. The interaction between the Council of Economic Advisors and health agencies can be delicate, since these groups may not value the same outcomes or support the same goals.
203. The Office of Management and Budget section of the statute is a replay of
various failed Congressional efforts to rein in Exec. Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193
(1981); Exec. Order 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (1985); and Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51,735 (1993) (concerning regulatory planning and review). See Pildes & Sunstein,
supra note 19, at 15–24 & n.70.

